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CRIMINAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND WALL STREET 
EXECUTIVES: 
WHY THE CRIMINAL PROVISIONS OF THE DODD-FRANK 
ACT FALL SHORT 
Jennifer G. Chawla* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On July 31, 2012, a federal jury acquitted Brian Stoker, a former 
mid-level manager of Citigroup Inc. (“Citigroup”), of charges that he 
misled investors as part of Citigroup’s complex mortgage securities 
scheme.1  This investment scheme was just one of many that large 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., Criminology, 2011, 
The College of New Jersey.  I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Kristin 
Johnson, and my comments editor, Charles Piasio, for their invaluable guidance and 
thoughtful feedback on this Comment. 
1 Chad Bray & Jean Eaglesham, Loss in Citi Case Deals Blow to U.S., WALL ST. J. (July 31, 
2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444860104577561380191553796.h
tml; Peter Lattman, Former Citigroup Manager Cleared in Mortgage Securities Case, 
DEALBOOK (July 31, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/31/former-
citigroup-manager-cleared-in-mortgage-securities-case; Grant McCool, SEC Loses Civil 
Fraud Case Against Ex-Citigroup Manager, REUTERS (July 31, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/citigroup-stoker-verdict-
idUSL2E8IVFOE20120731.  The allegation against Brian Stoker was that, as lead 
structurer of Citigroup’s synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO), known as 
Class V Funding III, he defrauded investors by failing to disclose that Citigroup not 
only had a role in selecting the collateral for the CDO, but also was simultaneously 
betting against the same CDO.  See Complaint at 19, SEC v. Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d 
605 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (No. 11-CV-7388).  CDOs are bank-created securities, formed by 
bundling various debt-instruments together and then selling shares of that bundle to 
investors.  Neal Deckant, Criticisms of Collateralized Debt Obligations in the Wake of the 
Goldman Sachs Scandal, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 407, 411–12 (2010).  During the 
housing boom, CDOs became a popular way for banks to make a profit.  See id. at 
418–21.  Soon afterwards, banks started creating synthetic CDOs by combining credit 
default swaps.  See id. at 425–26.  Credit default swaps are investments that function as 
a type of insurance on other securities; specifically, a party holding a debt obligation 
“swaps” the risk of investing in that obligation by paying another party a fee in 
exchange for a guarantee that the other party would pay the debt in the event of a 
default.  Id. at 415.  As a result, an investor buying a synthetic CDO was essentially 
betting that a bond held by someone else would not pay off.  See id.  The gravamen of 
the SEC’s complaint was that Citigroup was creating CDOs and selling them to 
investors without disclosing that they were also betting that those same CDOs would 
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banks perpetuated in the years leading up to the recent financial 
crisis, and this case was just another of the federal government’s 
unsuccessful attempts to hold an individual banking executive 
accountable.2  But there was something unique about this trial—its 
jury.  In an unexpected move, the Stoker jury delivered a special 
message to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).3  Penned 
on a scrap of yellow paper torn from a legal pad, a note enclosed 
within the verdict envelope read, “[t]his verdict should not deter the 
S.E.C. from continuing to investigate the financial industry[.]”4 
It is unusual for a jury to supplement its verdict with a statement, 
but this jury felt an explanation was necessary.  Although the SEC did 
not make a compelling case against this executive, the jury wanted it 
to be clear that the federal government must continue to pursue 
actions against the individuals responsible for the financial crisis.5  
The problem in Stoker, according to jury foreman Beau Brendler, was 
that the SEC targeted a relatively low-level manager, one whose 
behavior was not only tolerated, but possibly encouraged, by his 
bosses.6  Mr. Stoker did not act in a vacuum.  His actions were merely 
a glimpse into a much broader culture on Wall Street, one pervaded 
with greed and irresponsibility.7  The jury believed that the SEC was 
 
fail.  See Complaint, Stoker, 873 F. Supp. 2d 605 (No. 11-CV-7388).  CDOs are 
considered to be a “root cause” of the 2008 financial crisis.  Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets 
Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, DEALBOOK (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-jury-that 
-ruled-against-it. 
 2  See Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, A Financial Crisis with Little Guilt, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 14, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/14
/business/14prosecute.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (online version titled, In 
Financial Crisis, No Prosecutions of Top Figures). 
 3  The SEC is a federal agency created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. § 78a (2006) (“Exchange Act”).  The Exchange Act provides the SEC with 
disciplinary powers bring civil enforcement actions against those that violate the 
federal securities laws.  The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains 
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Feb. 20, 
2014, 8:56 AM), http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [hereinafter How the 
SEC Protects Investors]. 
 4  Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, supra note 1. 
 5  Id. 
 6  Id. 
 7  See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A 
Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture, and Ethics of Financial Risk Taking, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 1209 (2010) (analyzing the culture of financial firms in the years 
preceding the financial crisis and discussing how risk taking that begins as a 
calculated, rational action can become emotionally compromised, and consequently 
irrational, as a result of unnaturally prolonged periods of prosperity, increased 
competitive pressures, and unrealistic market demands). 
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making Mr. Stoker into a scapegoat for more generalized grievances 
toward the financial industry.8  For this reason, Mr. Brendler does not 
regret the verdict.  But he does have one lingering thought: “I wanted 
to know why the bank’s C.E.O. wasn’t on trial[.]”9 
In this regard, Mr. Brendler is not alone—his remarks are 
representative of a general public sentiment.  In the aftermath of the 
recent financial crisis, many are wondering why there have been no 
successful prosecutions of high-ranking bank executives.10  Although 
the SEC filed a handful of civil cases against managers of financial 
institutions,11 the Department of Justice (DOJ)12 has not filed a single 
 
 8  Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That Ruled Against It, supra note 1. 
 9  Susan Beck, Stoker Jury Foreman Explains How Verdict Didn’t Absolve Citi, 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202565823107/Stoker-Jury-Foreman-Explains-
How-Verdict-Didn’t-Absolve-Citi; Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury That 
Ruled Against It, supra note 1; Brian Stoker Jury Wants Wall Street CEOs Put on Trial, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012
/08/06/brian-stoker-jury_n_1747218.html. 
 10  See, e.g., Peter J. Boyer & Peter Schweizer, Why Can’t Obama Bring Wall Street to 
Justice?; Maybe the Banks Are Too Big to Jail. Or Maybe Washington’s Revolving Door Is at 
Work., NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2012, at 26, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com
/newsweek/2012/05/06/why-can-t-obama-bring-wall-street-to-justice.html; 
Morgenson & Story, supra note 2; Marian Wang, Why No Financial Crisis Prosecutions? 
Ex-Justice Official Says It’s Just Too Hard, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 6, 2011), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/why-no-financial-crisis-prosecutions-official-says-
its-just-too-hard; see also 60 Minutes: Prosecuting Wall Street (CBS television broadcast 
Dec. 4, 2011), available at http://www. cbsnews.com/8334-504803_162-57418062-
10391709/full-coverage-60-minutes-on-the-financial-crisis/?pageNum= 2&tag=next; 
Frontline: The Untouchables (PBS television broadcast Jan. 22, 2013), available at 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/untouchables. 
 11  Brian Stoker’s case was the first of these CDO-related cases to go to trial.  
McCool, supra note 1.  At the time of Stoker’s acquittal, former bank managers 
Fabrice Tourre of Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (“Goldman Sachs”) and Edward 
Steffelin of GSC Capital Corp. were awaiting trial on similar charges.  Id.  The SEC 
ultimately dropped the case against Steffelin.  Bob Van Voris & Greg Farrell, SEC 
Drops Case Against Manager Who Packaged ‘Squared’ CDO, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 16, 2012), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-16/sec-drops-case-against-manager-who-
packaged-squared-cdo.html.  But the case against Tourre was successful.  In August 
2013, a jury found Mr. Tourre liable on “six counts of civil securities fraud after a 
three-week jury trial” in which the SEC accused Mr. Tourre of “misleading a small 
group of investors about the role of a big client in a 2007 trade he helped structure.  
That client, the hedge fund Paulson & Company, made about $1 billion on the trade 
while [the other investors] lost big.”  Susanne Craig, Fabrice Tourre Seeks a New Trial, 
DEALBOOK (Oct. 1, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/10/01/fabrice-
tourre-seeks-a-new-trial/?_r=0. 
 12  While the SEC has authority to bring civil actions in response to violations of 
federal securities laws, How the SEC Protects Investors, supra note 3, the DOJ has 
authority to file criminal charges.  About DOJ, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Feb. 20, 2014, 9:14 
AM), http://www.justice.gov/about/about.html. 
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criminal charge against any senior banking executive of a large 
financial institution since its first attempt at prosecuting two 
managers of The Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. (“Bear Stearns”) 
resulted in acquittals in 2009.13 
This Comment evaluates whether recently enacted criminal 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)14 can facilitate the imposition of 
criminal liability on financial executives and allow for more effective 
prosecutorial efforts.  Part II of this Comment discusses the 
underlying causes of the 2008 financial crisis as well as the potentially 
criminal actions by banking executives that contributed to the burst 
of the housing bubble and the resulting economic collapse.  This Part 
then examines the aftermath of the financial crisis—specifically, the 
apparent decision of the DOJ not to pursue criminal actions against 
large financial institutions and their chief executive officers.  Finally, 
Part II describes the legislative response to the financial crisis—the 
Dodd-Frank Act15—which, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act16 before it, 
creates new federal crimes that the DOJ could use to prosecute 
individuals in the financial industry who use misleading and 
deceptive tactics for their own financial gain.  Part III explains the 
potential impact of criminal sanctions on corporate executives and 
articulates the importance of effectively imposing criminal liability on 
these individuals, as it can obtain deterrence objectives that civil 
liability cannot.  Part IV then examines specific criminal provisions of 
the Dodd-Frank Act and concludes that they will not be effective in 
imposing criminal liability on corporate executives; despite their 
appearances, these provisions do not substantively give the DOJ a new 
way to prosecute individual financial crimes, nor do they address the 
 
 13  Ben Hallman, Too Big to Jail: Wall Street Executives Unlikely to Face Criminal 
Charges, Source Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 8, 2012), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/08/criminal-charges-wall-
street_n_1857926.html?view=screen; Peter J. Henning, Is That It for Financial Crisis 
Cases?, DEALBOOK (Aug. 13, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 2012/08/13/is-
that-it-for-financial-crisis-cases. 
 14  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C, 
12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.). 
 15  Id. at 1376 (“An Act [t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial system, to end ‘too big to 
fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from 
abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes.”). 
 16  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (“An 
Act [t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate 
disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes.”). 
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issues that the DOJ seems to be having in bringing such criminal 
actions.  This Part then suggests how the government could improve 
the Dodd-Frank Act to better achieve deterrence objectives and allow 
the DOJ to more effectively prosecute individuals in the financial 
industry.  Part V concludes. 
II. THE 2008 FINANCIAL CRISIS AND ITS AFTERMATH 
A. The Causes of the Financial Crisis: Action and Inaction of Financial 
Executives 
Since late 2007, the United States has suffered through its worst 
economic downturn since the Great Depression.17  Economic growth 
is slow,18 unemployment rates are high,19 and the housing market 
remains fragile.20  In May 2009, Congress passed, and the President 
signed, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act.21  This Act 
established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (“the 
Commission”), an independent panel of ten private citizens tasked 
with “examin[ing] the causes, domestic and global, of the current 
financial and economic crisis in the United States.”22  In January 2011, 
after reviewing thousands of documents, interviewing over seven 
hundred witnesses, and holding nineteen public hearings in New 
York, Washington, D.C., and other communities affected by the 
financial crisis, the Commission published a comprehensive report 
detailing its findings.23 
 
 17  Edward P. Lazear, The Worst Economic Recovery in History, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 
2012, at A15, available at  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577311470997904292.h
tml; Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 1, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps
/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNivTjr852TI. 
 18  Annie Lowrey, Last Quarter’s Growth Is Revised Down Sharply, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/28/business/economy/last-quarters-
growth-is-revised-down-sharply.html. 
 19  Phil Izzo, Good News! The Unemployment Rate Rose, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2012, 
8:58 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2012/11/02/good-news-the 
-unemployment-rate-rose. 
 20  Kasia Klimasinska & Betty Liu, Housing-Market Recovery in U.S. Not ‘Resounding,’ 
Shiller Says, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-
11-06/housing-market-recovery-in-u-dot-s-dot-not-resounding-shiller-says. 
 21  Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 
Stat. 1617 (“An Act [t]o improve enforcement of mortgage fraud, securities and 
commodities fraud, financial institution fraud, and other frauds . . . for the recovery 
of funds lost to these frauds, and for other purposes.”). 
 22  Id. at § 5, 123 Stat. at 1625. 
 23  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, 978-0-16-087983-8, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY 
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First, the Commission concluded that the 2008 financial crisis 
was avoidable—“the result of human action and inaction.”24  
Although many individuals on Wall Street claimed that this crisis 
could not be foreseen or averted, the Commission found that 
warning signs, or “red flags,” were both abundant and largely 
ignored.25  In the years leading up to the crisis, financial institutions 
were creating, buying, and selling mortgage securities that they knew, 
or at least should have known, were defective.26  The spike in 
subprime mortgage lending and subsequent securitization27 led to an 
unsustainable rise in housing prices and, correspondingly, a 
substantial increase in individual household debt; simultaneously, a 
vast expansion of the unregulated derivatives trading market served 
to exacerbate the problem.28  Despite signs that these activities were 
posing a significant threat to the financial stability of the country, 
Wall Street institutions not only failed to take any mitigating actions, 
but continued to be active players in these risky markets.29 
The Commission also found that another significant 
contributing factor to the crisis was the failure among financial 
institutions in the areas of corporate governance and risk 
 
REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at xi–xii (2011), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. 
 24  Id. at xvii. 
 25  Id. at xvii–xviii. 
 26  Id. at xx. 
 27  Subprime mortgage lending refers to the practice of issuing “low-quality” 
mortgages, or mortgages issued to borrowers who lack “a quality credit history.”  
Deckant, supra note 1, at 422.  The subsequent securitization of these mortgages 
refers to their being “bundled together” and sold to investors as CDOs.  Id.  
Unsurprisingly, in early 2007, many of these subprime mortgages began to default, 
causing the “bubble” of inflated home prices to collapse.  Id. 
 28  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xx. 
 29  Id.  For example, in 2007, just as the crisis was beginning to come to light, 
Citigroup was criticized for being a major provider of loans used in leveraged 
buyouts.  See Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’, DEALBOOK (July 7, 2007), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/citi-chief-on-buyout-loans-were-still-
dancing; Joe Nocera, Op-Ed., The Safest Bank, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2012, at A23, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/16/opinion/nocera-the-safest-
bank.html.  Although initially lucrative, excessive lending of this kind was particularly 
risky because, in the case of a credit downturn, the bank would be unable to support 
the loans.  Id.  Former Citigroup Chief Executive Officer Charles Price, however, 
defended his bank’s participation in this market by saying, “[a]s long as the music is 
playing, you’ve got to get up and dance[.]”  Citi Chief on Buyouts: ‘We’re Still Dancing’, 
supra. 
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management.30  Prior to 2007, the prevailing view was that regulating 
financial institutions would restrain innovation.31  Without sufficient 
regulation, however, banks engaged in extremely reckless behavior, 
“taking on too much risk, with too little capital, and with too much 
dependence on short-term funding.”32  In addition, executive 
compensation systems worked to further incentivize excessive risk-
taking by rewarding executives for taking short-term risks, often by 
leveraging excessive shareholder funds, without sufficient regard for 
the long-term consequences.33 
Another study recently found further support for the notion that 
inadequate regulatory oversight may foster a criminogenic 
environment.34  A survey of five hundred “financial services 
professionals” across the United States and the United Kingdom 
revealed that twenty-four percent of respondent professionals 
believed, in order to be successful, they would need to engage in 
unethical or illegal conduct; twenty-six percent claimed they had 
firsthand knowledge of wrongdoing in the workplace; and sixteen 
percent said they would commit a crime if they knew they could get 
 
 30  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xviii–xix. 
 31  Id. 
 32  Id. at xviii. 
 33  Id. at xviii–xix.  Specifically, some scholars argue that executive compensation 
packages focus solely on short-term profits, which enable executives to receive large 
cash amounts, equity-based compensation, and bonus compensation before the long-
term consequences of their actions are realized.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger 
Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 247, 249 (2010).  These executives 
therefore have an incentive to focus on short-term results, without giving sufficient 
weight to the consequences that risk-taking may have on shareholder value in the 
long-term.  Id.  Further, these scholars argue that some executive compensation 
packages are “tied to highly levered bets on the value of the banks’ assets” and the 
structure of these compensation packages gives executives even less incentive to 
account for the “losses that risk-taking could impose on preferred shareholders, 
bondholders, depositors, and taxpayers.”  Id.  Not all scholars, however, agree that 
executive risk-taking was a driving factor in the financial crisis.  See Andrea Beltratti & 
Rene M. Stulz, Why Did Some Banks Perform Better During the Credit Crisis?  A Cross-
Country Study of the Impact of Governance and Regulation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 15180, 2009), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15180.pdf (arguing that banks with “more loans and 
more liquid assets” performed better than banks with “stronger capital supervision” 
during the financial crisis). 
 34  Financial Services Professionals Feel Unethical Behavior May Be a Necessary Evil and 
Have Knowledge of Workplace Misconduct, According to Labaton Sucharow Survey, LABATON 
SUCHAROW (Feb. 20, 2014, 9:47 AM), http://www.labaton.com/en
/about/press/Labaton-Sucharow-announces-results-of-financial-services-professional 
-survey.cfm. 
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away with it.35  Furthermore, thirty-nine percent of respondents said 
they believed their competitors are likely to have engaged in illegal or 
unethical activity in order to be successful; thirty percent stated that 
their compensation or bonus plans create pressure to compromise 
ethical standards or violate the law; and twenty-three percent 
reported other pressures that may lead to unethical or illegal 
conduct.36 
Finally, the Commission concluded that “there was a systemic 
breakdown in accountability and ethics.”37  Mortgage fraud, for 
example, flourished during 2006–2007 as a result of low lending 
standards and lenient regulation.38  Financial institutions were 
making loans that they knew borrowers would not be able to afford.39  
These banks then packaged the loans and sold them to investors, 
even though they knew that these loans did not “meet their own 
underwriting standards or those of the originators.”40  Banks 
accomplished this scheme by disingenuously sampling the packages 
of loans that they were selling so that this information would remain 
undisclosed to potential investors.41 
Eventually, the borrowers of the underlying mortgages began to 
default—the housing market bubble burst and owners of the 
mortgage-backed securities lost their investments.42  Many of these 
 
 35  Id. 
 36  Id. 
 37  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 23, at xxii. 
 38  Id. 
 39  Id. 
 40  Id. 
 41  Id.  For example, Richard Bowen, who served as senior vice president and 
chief underwriter for correspondent and acquisitions for Citigroup’s commercial 
lending group from 2002 to 2005, described in a recent interview how loans that 
were being considered for purchase from Citigroup would consistently be missing 
critical documents that would have been necessary to determine whether they met 
the bank’s credit policy guidelines (e.g., income documentation necessary to verify a 
loan applicant’s income to debt ratio).  In sum, Mr. Bowen found that sixty percent 
of loans purchased either did not meet the bank’s standards or were missing too 
much information for the underwriters to make an adequate evaluation of their 
creditworthiness.  Nevertheless, the decisions of the underwriters to turn down the 
purchase of such loans were reversed by “someone high up the chain of command, 
the chief risk officer of the Wall Street channel.”  This resulted in an increase in the 
“execution percentage” of these pools and a subsequent purchase of them by 
Citigroup.  Azmat Khan, Blowing the Whistle on the Mortgage Bubble, PBS (Jan. 22, 2013 
9:44PM), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/business-economy-financial-
crisis/untouchables/blowing-the-whistle-on-the-mortgage-bubble. 
 42  Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of Financial Regulation, 
17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 279, 290–91 (2011). 
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investors, however, had purchased CDOs43 to insure against these 
losses.44  As a result, the magnitude of the impact that these defaults 
would ultimately have on the economy was not fully realized until it 
was revealed that many CDO issuers were not adequately capitalized 
to make good on their promises to compensate protected investors 
from losses.45  This resulted in a domino effect of defaults and 
insolvency, shaking the foundation of many Wall Street firms and 
crippling the United States economy.46 
B. The Department of Justice’s Response: No Criminal Prosecutions 
Since the publication of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Phil 
Angelides, who served as chairman of the Commission, has 
repeatedly called upon the DOJ to pursue criminal investigations 
against Wall Street executives.47  In these appeals, Chairman 
Angelides stressed the importance of focusing on criminal, rather 
than civil, wrongdoing because the latter fails to deter future crimes,48 
something which is especially true in light of the fact that “[c]laims of 
financial fraud against companies like Citigroup and Bank of 
America have been settled for pennies on the dollar, with no 
admission of wrongdoing.”49  Chairman Angelides has further urged 
the federal government to devote more resources toward pursuing 
these investigations, stating that, as the situation stands, justice has 
not been served.50  But despite the findings of the Commission and 
against the advisement of its chairman, the DOJ has failed to 
 
 43  Collaterized debt obligations.  See discussion supra note 1. 
 44  Sharma, supra note 42, at 290. 
 45  See id. at 290–91. 
 46  See id. 
 47  Phil Angelides, Op-Ed., Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 
2012, at A25, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/opinion/will-wall-
street-ever-face-justice.html?_r=0; Phil Angelides, Op-Ed., Renew Urgency on Wall Street 
Probe, POLITICO (Sept. 4, 2012), 
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0912/80606.html. 
 48  Angelides, Renew Urgency on Wall Street Probe, supra note 47 (“Deterring future 
crimes can’t be accomplished simply through fines or negotiated financial 
settlements—which many banks regard as the cost of doing business. Senior 
executives need to know that if they violate the law, there will be real 
consequences.”). 
 49  Angelides, Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, supra note 47. 
 50  Id. (“No one should seek or condone prosecutions for revenge or political 
purposes.  But laws need to be enforced to deter future malfeasance.  Just as 
important, the American people need to believe that a thorough investigation has 
been conducted; that our judicial system has been fair to all, regardless of wealth and 
power; and that wrongs have been righted.”). 
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prosecute any top executive of a Wall Street institution in the years 
since the crisis.51  Furthermore, as time passes, it becomes increasingly 
unlikely that any such prosecution will materialize.52 
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, the prospect of an 
aggressive response from federal law enforcement seemed promising.  
On June 19, 2008, the DOJ announced that the United States 
Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York had indicted 
Ralph Cioffi and Mathew Tannin, two senior managers of Bear 
Stearns, on counts of conspiracy, securities fraud, and wire fraud.53  
The indictments alleged that Cioffi and Tannin “marketed the two 
funds as a low risk strategy, backed by a pool of debt securities such as 
mortgages” and, even though they “believed the funds were in grave 
condition and at risk of collapse,” they “made misrepresentations to 
stave off investor withdrawal.”54 
As the first major prosecution stemming from the financial crisis, 
many followed this case closely, as they believed it would set the scene 
for how future cases would unfold.55  The prosecution, however, 
proved futile—a jury acquitted the managers in November 2009.56  
The government’s case, which relied primarily on statements made 
 
 51  Boyer & Schweizer, supra note 10; Morgenson & Story, supra note 2; Peter 
Schweizer, Obama’s DOJ and Wall Street: Too Big For Jail?, FORBES (May 7, 2012), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/05/07/obamas-doj-and-wall-street-too 
-big-for-jail. 
 52  Generally, the statute of limitations for securities fraud and other federal 
offenses is five years from the commission of the alleged wrongdoing for civil actions, 
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2) (2006), and ten years from the commission of the alleged 
wrongdoing for a criminal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3293(3) (2006).  Time, therefore, is 
running out, especially for actions that occurred during the “bubble years” (i.e., the 
years prior to 2007 when excessive subprime mortgage lending and securitization 
caused the unsustainable spike in housing prices).  No Crime, No Punishment, 
Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2012, at SR10, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/opinion/sunday/no-crime-no-
punishment.html; see Hallman, supra note 13; Henning, supra note 13; Wang, supra 
note 10. 
 53  Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, More Than 400 Defendants Charged for 
Roles in Mortgage Fraud Schemes as Part of Operation “Malicious Mortgage” (June 
19, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/June/08-odag-551.html. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Amir Efrati & Peter Lattman, U.S. Loses Bear Fraud Case, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125788421912541971.html; Ex-Bear Stearns 
Hedge Fund Managers Acquitted, REUTERS (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/10/bearstearns-managers-
idUSN1032890420091110; Zachery Kouwe, Bear Stearns Managers Acquitted of Fraud 
Charges, DEALBOOK (Nov. 10, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/10 
/2-ex-fund-managers-found-not-guilty-of-fraud. 
 56  Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55; Kouwe, supra note 55. 
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by the executives via email,57 demonstrated the difficulty of proving 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in modern financial fraud cases.58  
Not only do these cases involve complex investment instruments that 
the government had little information on prior to the crisis,59 but, 
within the framework of this unprecedented market failure, the 
distinction between executives’ intentionally misleading statements 
and their “positive spin[s] on sagging returns” that just ultimately 
proved to be incorrect seems blurred.60  Particularly in the Bear 
Stearns case, despite the government’s best attempts to present Cioffi 
and Tannin’s actions as a straightforward case of lying, the jury did 
not believe that the statements, once put into context, were sufficient 
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.61  After the trial, one juror 
explained: “The entire market crashed . . . . You can’t blame that on 
two people.”62 
Despite this setback, the federal government remained 
committed to its prosecutorial efforts.  That same month, President 
Obama appointed United States Attorney General Eric Holder as 
chairman of the newly created Financial Fraud Enforcement Task 
Force.63  At the time, Attorney General Holder stated that mission of 
the Task Force was to “hold accountable those who helped bring 
about the last financial meltdown” and “to prevent another meltdown 
from happening.”64  He further declared that “[w]e will be relentless 
in our investigation of corporate and financial wrongdoing, and will 
 
 57  The prosecution used email exchanges between Cioffi and Tannin in an 
attempt to prove that the two managers were personally aware of the true financial 
condition of the funds and lied to investors in order to keep them from withdrawing.  
Landon Thomas Jr., 2 Face Fraud Charges in Bear Stearns Debacle, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 
2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/20
/business/20bear.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (online version titled, Prosecutors Build 
Bear Stearns Case on E-Mails).  Excerpted portions of the emails include statements 
such as: “[The subprime market looks] pretty damn ugly”; “[W]e should close the 
funds now . . . . The entire subprime market [is] toast”; “I’m fearful of these 
markets”; and “Believe it or not—I’ve been able to convince people to add more 
money.”  Id. 
 58  Kouwe, supra note 55. 
 59  Morgenson & Story, supra note 2. 
 60  Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55. 
 61  Bear Stearns Trial: How the Scapegoats Escaped, DEALBOOK (Nov. 12, 2009), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/bear-stearns-trial-how-the-scapegoats 
-escaped. 
 62  Id. 
 63  Schweizer, supra note 51. 
 64  Ted Kaufman, Why DOJ Deemed Bank Execs Too Big To Jail, FORBES (July 29, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tedkaufman/2013/07/29/why-doj-deemed-
bank-execs-too-big-to-jail. 
CHAWLA (DO NOT DELETE) 5/12/2014  1:58 PM 
948 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:937 
 
not hesitate to bring charges, where appropriate, for criminal 
misconduct on the part of businesses and business executives.”65 
But in the years since the formation of this task force, the DOJ 
still has not filed a single criminal charge against any major banking 
executive.66  It dropped its most recent attempt at such a pursuit, an 
investigation into Goldman Sachs’s “Abacus” deal,67 in August 2012.68  
Furthermore, this lack of prosecutions seems to be indicative of a 
more general trend.  Financial fraud prosecutions, as a whole, are 
down thirty-nine percent since the accounting scandals of the early 
2000s69—a time when the DOJ was much more aggressive in 
prosecuting not only financial fraud generally, but also high-level 
executives individually, for this type of fraud.70 
For example, in October 2001, regulators discovered that Enron 
Corporation (“Enron”) had been misrepresenting its earnings and 
 
 65  Id. 
 66  Id.; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY INST., JUSTICE INACTION: THE DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE’S UNPRECEDENTED FAILURE TO PROSECUTE BIG FINANCE 4 (2012), available at 
http://g-a-i.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/DOJ-Report-8-61.pdf [hereinafter 
JUSTICE INACTION]. 
 67  In 2007, Goldman Sachs created a risky investment called Abacus 2007-AC1 at 
the request of a prominent client.  Goldman Sachs then allowed the client to choose 
bonds to shape the investment instrument.  Although Goldman Sachs and the client 
bet against the Abacus instrument, Goldman Sachs did not disclose this information 
or information about how the bonds were selected to its other clients who had 
invested in its success.  These uninformed clients lost more than a billion dollars on 
the deal.  As a result, the SEC charged Goldman Sachs with securities fraud, 
specifically for making materially misleading statements or omissions; the SEC 
simultaneously referred the case to the DOJ for criminal investigation.  Boyer & 
Schweizer, supra note 10. 
 68  The case with the SEC eventually settled, with Goldman Sachs maintaining no 
wrongdoing.  Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Goldman Sachs to Pay 
Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime Mortgage CDO 
(July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-123.htm.  In 
the settlement papers, Goldman Sachs merely acknowledged that “the marketing 
materials for the ABACUS 2007-AC1 transaction contained incomplete information” 
and that “Goldman regrets that the marketing materials did not contain [the] 
disclosure.”  Id.  Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, 
noted that “[h]alf a billion dollars is the largest penalty ever assessed against a 
financial services firm in the history of the SEC” and “[t]his settlement is a stark 
lesson to Wall Street firms that no product is too complex, and no investor too 
sophisticated, to avoid a heavy price if a firm violates the fundamental principles of 
honest treatment and fair dealing.”  Id.  But, as some commentators have noted, for 
Goldman Sachs, this penalty is “a relative pittance.”  Boyer & Schweizer, supra note 
10.  In fact, “[t]he fine amounted to about 4 percent of the sum that Goldman paid 
its executives in bonuses ($12.1 billion) in 2007, the year of the Abacus transaction.”  
Id. 
 69  JUSTICE INACTION, supra note 66, at 6. 
 70  Id. 
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altering its balance sheets in order to make the company seem more 
profitable than it actually was.71  Eventually, this behavior prompted 
Enron to declare bankruptcy.72  Shortly afterward, the DOJ charged 
Enron Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey 
Skilling with securities fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy; both 
executives were found guilty on all counts.73  The DOJ obtained 
similar guilty verdicts in criminal actions against Worldcom, Inc. 
(“Worldcom”) CEO Bernard Ebbers,74 Tyco International Ltd. 
(“Tyco”) CEO Dennis Koslowski, and Tyco Chief Financial Officer 
(CFO) Mark Swartz.75 
Various theories exist to explain why the DOJ is not more 
actively pursuing cases of financial fraud since the recent financial 
crisis.  Some commentators suggest the lack of regulation that 
perpetuated the crisis has, in its aftermath, made it difficult to 
subsequently pursue those same behaviors that more adequate 
regulation could have prevented.76  This is because, in the past, 
regulators who were specifically trained to understand and dissect 
complex financial matters were able to identify fraudulent practices 
early and, when necessary, refer cases to the DOJ for criminal 
prosecution.  The data collected by these regulators was crucial to the 
DOJ’s efforts to build criminal cases.77  No such information is 
available, however, for cases alleging fraud in connection with 
complex derivative securities, which were unregulated before the 
crisis.78 
 
 71  Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From a Perfect Storm of 
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 
163, 262 n.35 (2003). 
 72  Id. at 262, n.1 
 73  Paul Davies & Kara Scannell, Guilty Verdicts Provide ‘Red Meat’ To Prosecutors 
Chasing Companies, WALL ST. J., May 26, 2006, at A1, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114860468837563784.html. 
 74  Bernard Ebbers was charged with, and found guilty of, securities fraud, 
conspiracy, and making false filings with securities regulators.  He was alleged to have 
been using dishonest accounting practices to inflate Worldcom’s stock price.  Id. 
 75  Dennis Koslowski and Mark Swartz were charged with, and found guilty of, 
conspiracy, grand larceny, securities fraud, and falsifying business records after they 
were discovered stealing millions of dollars from Tyco.  Walter Hamilton & Thomas 
S. Mulligan, Ex-Chiefs Convicted of Looting Tyco, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2005, at A1, 
available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/jun/18/business/fi-tyco18. 
 76  Morgenson & Story, supra note 2. 
 77  Id. 
 78  Id. (“[I]n 1995, bank regulators referred 1,837 cases to the Justice 
Department.  In 2006, that number had fallen to 75.  In the four subsequent years, a 
period encompassing the worst of the crisis, an average of only 72 a year have been 
referred for criminal prosecution.”). 
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Another possibility is that the element of mens rea, or intent, 
that prosecutors must prove in a criminal case imposes too high a 
burden.  The DOJ proffered this explanation when it announced its 
decision not to prosecute Goldman Sachs.79  It was also a reason why 
the DOJ was not successful in the Bear Stearns trial.80  To prove fraud 
in federal cases, the prosecution must show that the defendant 
intended to make material misstatements or omissions,81 and this 
intent must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.82  This can be 
difficult in cases involving complex securities sold to sophisticated 
investors because investment banks tend to include voluminous, 
generic disclosure statements that they can later use to claim a lack of 
intent to deceive.83  Moreover, in the context of the recent financial 
crisis and its “unprecedented market turmoil,” the question of 
whether financial executives were intentionally misleading their 
investors or merely “putting a positive spin” on the banks’ market 
performance is unclear.84  Thus, banks can argue that “while certain 
statements by executives ultimately proved incorrect . . . they believed 
what they were saying.”85 
Notwithstanding the merits of these theories, the sentiment 
among government officials, prosecutors, and commentators seems 
to support the notion that, although the individual conduct that led 
to the financial crisis was undoubtedly reprehensible, criminal 
accountability is not realistically attainable under current law.86 
 
 79  Reed Albergotti & Elizabeth Rappaport, U.S. Not Seeking Goldman Charges, 
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10000872396390443537404577579840698144490.html; David Ingram, Justice 
Department Will Not Prosecute Goldman Sachs, Employees for Abacus Deal, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/09/us-usa-goldman-no-charges-
idUSBRE8781LA20120809; Phil Mattingly, U.S. Won’t Prosecute Goldman Sachs, 
Employees Over CDO Deals, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/2012-08-09/justice-finds-no-viable-basis-for-charges-against-goldman.html. 
 80  Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55. 
 81  18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2012). 
 82  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[T]he Due Process Clause protects 
the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged[.]”) (emphasis added); see 
also David Ingram & Aruna Viswanatha, Goldman Sachs Will Not Face Criminal Charges: 
Justice Department, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 9, 2012),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/08/09/goldman-sachs-justice-
department_n_1762455.html; No Crime, No Punishment, supra note 52. 
 83  Henning, supra note 13. 
 84  Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55. 
 85  Id. 
 86  See JUSTICE INACTION, supra note 66, at 16 (quoting Attorney General Eric 
Holder: “[W]e found that much of the conduct that led to the financial crisis was 
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C. The Congressional Response: The Dodd-Frank Act 
Legislators responded to the financial crisis by enacting the 
Dodd-Frank Act.87  The stated purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act is to 
improve “accountability and transparency in the financial system.”88  
As a result, the Dodd-Frank Act’s primary function is to introduce 
various new reforms for regulating the financial industry, but it also 
creates some new federal crimes related to fraud and 
misrepresentations made by individuals engaging in derivatives 
trading, futures contracts, and swaps.89  These provisions, largely 
found in Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, serve primarily to expand 
upon existing laws, such as the Commodity Exchange Act,90 in order 
to include previously unregulated derivatives and security swap 
transactions.91 
Specifically, there are two sections in the Dodd-Frank Act that 
address the use of deceptive devices, materially misleading statements 
or omissions, and fraud in financial transactions: Sections 741 and 
747.  Section 741 provides that it shall be a crime for a person to, in 
connection with making a future contract or swap of securities, 
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”; “make any 
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading”; 
or “engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates 
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.”92  Section 
747 states that it shall be a crime for a person who, while entering 
into a securities swap transaction,93 knows or acts in reckless disregard 
 
unethical and irresponsible . . . we have also discovered that some of this behavior—
while morally reprehensible—may not necessarily be criminal”); Peter Lattman, U.S. 
Goldman Disclosure a Rare Break in Secrecy, DEALBOOK (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/10/justice-department-closes-investigation-
of-goldman (“[B]ased on the law and evidence as they exist at this time, there is not a 
viable basis to bring a criminal prosecution against Goldman Sachs.”); see also 
Mattingly, supra note 79 (quoting Senator Carl Levin: “Whether the decision by the 
Department of Justice is the product of weak laws or weak enforcement, Goldman 
Sachs’ actions were deceptive and immoral.”). 
 87  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 88  Id. 
 89  Id. 
 90  Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 91  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 92  Id. at § 741, 124 Stat. at 1731. 
 93  One example of a securities swap transaction is a credit default swap.  In a 
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of the fact that “its counterparty will use the swap as part of a device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud any third party.”94 
The Dodd-Frank Act contains several other provisions that 
purport to be enforceable by criminal sanctions.95  The scope of this 
Comment, however, is limited to evaluating whether the criminal 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act can facilitate the imposition of 
criminal liability on financial executives for fraud and 
misrepresentation.  Therefore, the analysis that follows96 will focus 
solely on those aforementioned provisions in Title VII, as they 
specifically relate to the making of false or misleading statements or 
omissions. 
III. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE EXECUTIVES 
A. The Need for Personal Liability for Corporate Crimes 
The imposition of personal liability on corporate executives 
serves important deterrence objectives.97  The threat of personal 
liability for misconduct can dissuade managers and directors from 
abusing their positions of power for personal gain.98  It can also 
encourage these managers and directors to utilize their oversight 
authority to prevent other executives from engaging in self-serving 
misconduct.99 
Furthermore, in the absence of personal liability, punishment 
would be levied against the corporation itself.  A corporation, 
 
credit default swap, the investor of the security pays a premium to a counterparty 
(e.g., a third party which, by virtue of a contract, becomes vulnerable to financial 
risk).  In exchange, the counterparty agrees to pay the investor a specified sum upon 
the occurrence of a “credit event.”  An example of a triggering credit event would be 
a default in payments on the underlying asset.  This exchange functions as a type of 
insurance against credit risk for the investor.  Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open 
Source: The Outsourcing of Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial 
Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 160 (2009). 
 94  Dodd-Frank Act § 747, 124 Stat. at 1675–76. 
 95  See, e.g., id. at § 723, 124 Stat. at 1675–76  (making it a crime for any person to 
enter into a swap transaction without first submitting the swap for clearing to a 
registered derivatives clearing organization); id. at § 746, 124 Stat. at 1737 
(addressing insider trading); id. at § 747, 124 Stat. at 1739 (making it a crime for one 
engaged in trading to “violat[e] bids or offers”; “demonstrate[e] intentional or 
reckless disregard for the orderly execution of transactions”; be involved in “spoofing 
(bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution)”). 
 96  See infra Part IV.A. 
 97  See Lisa L. Casey, Twenty-Eight Words: Enforcing Corporate Fiduciary Duties Through 
Criminal Prosecution of Honest Services Fraud, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (2010). 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. 
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however, is a fictional entity.100  When it acts, it is acting through its 
agents.101  Therefore, it is not the behavior of the corporation as an 
entity that needs to be punished and deterred, but rather the 
behavior of its agents (i.e., its managers and directors).102  Sanctions 
against the corporation, which usually take the form of fines, do not 
serve this deterrence goal because they “harm innocent parties such 
as shareholders, consumers, and creditors, rather than guilty 
corporate agents.”103 
B. Civil Actions Do Not Effectively Impose Personal Liability on 
Corporate Executives 
Not everyone believes that personal liability via the criminal 
justice system is an appropriate mechanism for dealing with 
corporate misconduct.104  High-profile criminal prosecutions of 
corporate officers can result in lengthy terms of incarceration for 
individuals with no prior criminal history.105  Accordingly, some 
scholars argue that private actions in the civil realm, which impose 
monetary penalties, provide a more suitable solution.106  The problem 
with such an approach, however, is that it fails to address whether the 
civil system is actually effective in responding to this kind of 
misbehavior.107 
Under traditional notions of corporate law, directors and 
officers of corporations are largely insulated from personal liability.108  
First, plaintiffs often face significant procedural and substantive 
hurdles in the context of shareholder derivative suits,109 which are 
suits brought on behalf of the corporation against executives alleged 
 
 100  Wilson Meeks, Corporate and White-Collar Crime Enforcement: Should Regulation 
and Rehabilitation Spell an End to Corporate Criminal Liability?, 40 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 77, 85 (2006). 
 101  Id. 
 102  Id. (citing John C. Coffee, Jr., “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An 
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 386 
(1981)). 
 103  Id. at 86. 
 104  Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361, 364 
(2008). 
 105  Id. 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id. at 380. 
 108  Lisa M. Fairfax, On the Sufficiency of Corporate Regulation As an Alternative to 
Corporate Criminal Liability, 41 STETSON L. REV. 117, 118 (2011); Martin Petrin, 
Circumscribing The “Prosecutor’s Ticket To Tag the Elite”—A Critique of the Responsible 
Corporate Officer Doctrine, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 283, 303 (2012). 
 109  Fairfax, supra note 108. 
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to have breached their fiduciary duties.110  Procedurally, shareholders 
are limited in the claims they can bring as a result of the demand 
requirement,111 which allows a corporation’s Board of Directors to 
terminate a derivative suit before it reaches trial.112  Substantively, if 
the demand requirement does not bar the claims, executives are still 
protected by the deferential business judgment rule.113  Second, even 
in cases where the business judgment rule is inapplicable, because 
either the director is found to have acted in bad faith or the action is 
one brought by a third party, statutory and contract provisions may 
work to exculpate the director from personal liability.114  Finally, 
assuming that an executive is found liable and the situation is such 
 
 110  Officers and directors of corporations, while acting in their capacity as 
managers, owe fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders.  Smith v. Van 
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).  These duties include the duty of care, the 
duty of loyalty, and the duty to act in good faith.  If a director breaches any one of 
these duties, a shareholder of the corporation may bring a derivative action on 
behalf of the corporation to enforce the duty.  John A. Pearce II & Ilya A. Lipin, The 
Duties of Directors and Officers Within the Fuzzy Zone of Insolvency, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 361, 370 (2011). 
 111  Every jurisdiction requires a shareholder to “make a demand” (i.e., seek 
redress for his or her grievances) on the corporation’s Board of Directors before the 
shareholder can bring a derivative suit against those directors.  Carol B. Swanson, 
Juggling Shareholder Rights and Strike Suits in Derivative Litigation: The ALI Drops the Ball, 
77 MINN. L. REV. 1339, 1349–50 (1993).  Generally, a shareholder is only excused 
from making a demand if he or she can demonstrate that making the demand would 
be futile.  Id.  The purpose of this requirement is to give the corporation’s board a 
chance to address the shareholder’s complaints without litigation.  Id.  If the 
managers believe that the shareholder’s claims have merit, they may choose to take 
corrective actions.  Id.  If the managers do not agree with the claims, however, they 
may refuse to take action and even seek early dismissal of a derivative suit related to 
such claims.  Id. 
 112  Fairfax, supra note 108. 
 113  Id. The business judgment rule is a doctrine of corporate law that works to 
protect directors and officers from being held liable for breaching their fiduciary 
duty of care if the basis for the alleged breach can be framed as a “business decision.”  
The business judgment rule is broad and protects against most claims brought 
against these individuals by shareholders on behalf of the corporation, unless it can 
be shown that the decision was based on “intentional or bad faith misconduct.”  
Petrin, supra note 108, at 303–04. 
 114  Fairfax, supra note 108.  All states provide an indemnification statute within 
their corporate laws.  Petrin, supra note 108, at 317.  These statutes proscribe 
mandatory and permissive instances where employees of a corporation would be 
indemnified from liability.  Id.  In addition, many corporate officers and directors 
will have even broader indemnification rights as a result of the corporation’s charter 
or by-laws.  Id.  It is very common for public corporations to agree to indemnify their 
managers and directors “to the fullest extent permitted by law.” These 
indemnification agreements generally cover an executive’s litigation expenses and 
attorneys’ fees in addition to any amounts incurred as judgments, fines, or 
settlements.  Casey, supra note 97, at 21–22. 
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that the corporation does not indemnify his or her actions, the 
corporation may still provide director and officer insurance that 
would most likely cover all payments that are owed by the 
defendant.115 
In addition to the obstacles imposed by law, civil suits also suffer 
from practical hindrances.  Private lawsuits do not provide an 
effective response to instances of “low-level fraud.”116  This is because, 
for the average shareholder, it is often not economically feasible to 
take on the cost of litigation against the managers and directors of a 
corporation, especially if the alleged misconduct did not cause 
substantial diminution in the value of their shares.117  Joining together 
and filing a collective action can also be difficult, especially in light of 
the aforementioned procedural and substantive hurdles associated 
with these suits.118  SEC enforcement actions against individual 
executives are similarly sparse, and even when the agency does decide 
to bring a case, the penalties are often not significant.119  Therefore, 
while directors who engage in misconduct face a theoretical financial 
risk, this risk does not, in practice, constitute a truly deterrent 
threat.120 
Because civil liability is not well-equipped to deter individual 
executives from engaging in wrongful acts, it does not provide an 
adequate remedy for corporate misconduct.121  Since the risk of 
detection and liability is small, managers who stand to gain from 
unlawful activity will view the possibility of being sanctioned as a mere 
cost of doing business.122  In the same way that under-enforcement of 
petty street crimes can lead to “urban decay,” which in turn leads to 
the commission of more serious crimes, one scholar has paralleled 
 
 115  Casey, supra note 97, at 36; Petrin, supra note 108, at 320–21 (“Corporations 
may purchase insurance to protect their directors, officers, employees, or agents 
against personal liability arising out of ‘wrongful acts’ for which they are not 
indemnified.  For instance, virtually all public companies purchase directors and 
officers (‘D&O’) insurance.  Insurance can provide for broader protection than 
indemnification, as corporate law does not place any limitations on the permissible 
scope of D&O coverage.”); see also Fairfax, supra note 108 (“[P]rocedural and 
substantive rules, together with the trinity of D&O insurance, indemnification 
provisions, and exculpatory statutes, have combined to make outside directors’ risk 
of personal liability under corporate law virtually non-existent.”). 
 116  Hurt, supra note 104, at 372. 
 117  Id. at 381. 
 118  Id. 
 119  Fairfax, supra note 108, at 121. 
 120  Id. 
 121  Casey, supra note 97, at 85. 
 122  Id. 
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the under-enforcement of “small-scale corporate fraud” as similarly 
leading to “an environment of renegade entrepreneurs who are not 
able to properly assess the probabilities of penalties for certain 
behaviors.”123 
C. Criminal Law Provides a Solution 
When applied in the corporate context, criminal law can 
effectively deter executive misconduct because it is not inhibited by 
the protections that executives enjoy in the civil realm.124  Criminal 
actions brought by the government are not subject to the same 
procedural and substantive hurdles, such as the demand requirement 
and the business judgment rule, that typically bar private shareholder 
actions.125  In addition, exculpatory charter provisions cannot 
exculpate a manager or director from personal criminal liability, and 
there are no statutory indemnifications for violation of criminal 
laws.126  As a result, these officers can be held accountable under 
criminal law for certain behaviors which, under traditional notions of 
corporate law, would not result in personal liability.127 
When laws are under-enforced, their ability to deter violations is 
minimal, regardless of the potential sanction.  It is the certainty of 
punishment, not its severity, which can more effectively dissuade an 
individual from violating the law.128  Because corporate law 
protections do not apply to criminal actions, the government has 
procedural and substantive advantages in bringing criminal cases that 
allow it to attain higher conviction rates and, therefore, greater 
deterrent effects.129 
 
 123  Hurt, supra note 104, at 373. 
 124  See Petrin, supra note 108, at 304. 
 125  Id. 
 126  Id. 
 127  Id; see Casey, supra note 97, at 1. 
 128  Raymond Paternoster, How Much Do We Really Know About Criminal Deterrence?, 
100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 765, 778 (2010) (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and 
Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 178 (1968)) (“[T]he 
certainty of legal penalties are more important than their severity.”); see also Hurt, 
supra note 104, at 373.  An example of this principle, in a more prosaic situation, is a 
car driving on a road where violation of the speed limit results in a $100 fine.  If 
police rarely patrol the road, drivers would most likely not be deterred from violating 
the speed limit.  Even if the fine is raised to $200, as long as the road remains 
unpatrolled, violations are likely to continue at comparable rates.  But, if instead of 
increasing the fine, the police begin patrolling more frequently, drivers will be 
encouraged to slow down.  The increased certainty of detection will have more of a 
deterrent effect than the increase in severity of a potential sanction. 
 129  See Casey, supra note 97, at 44. 
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From a procedural standpoint, prosecutors have significant 
discretion in charging decisions.130  Substantively, they have a wide 
range of crimes within the federal criminal code from which to 
choose these charges.131  Grand juries also do not pose much of a 
hurdle in criminal prosecutions because they frequently cooperate 
with prosecutors and return requested indictments.132  In addition, 
pleading standards are more favorable for prosecutors than they are 
for private plaintiffs.  “Unlike shareholder plaintiffs, who must plead 
fraud with height-ened [sic] particularity in both state and federal 
court, prosecutors need only provide a plain, concise, and definite 
written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense 
charged.”133  As a result, it is very uncommon for criminal actions to 
be dismissed on a motion by the defendant at the pleading stage.134 
Criminal law is also capable of deterring wrongdoing because of 
its unique sociological impact.  At least one scholar has argued that 
the aspect of “shaming” implicit in criminal sanctions can have an 
“effective influence” on the individual and, correspondingly, 
corporate behavior, especially when applied to “top-level corporate 
executives.”135  These executives are all part of a common community 
that is comprised of very “status-conscious” individuals.136  Exposing 
this population to criminal prosecution, which carries with it the 
potential for incarceration, can have damaging effects on their 
reputations, even when the exposure comes only in the form of a 
threat.137  Studies have found that both the anticipation, as well as the 
experience, of this type of “shame” can substantially deter corporate 
crime138 on both the general and specific level.139 
 
 130  Id. 
 131  Id. 
 132  Id. 
 133  Id. at 45 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1)) (quotations omitted). 
 134  Id. 
 135  Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 959, 966 (1999). 
 136  Id. 
 137  Id. at 970–71. 
 138  BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, THE IMPACT OF PUBLICITY ON CORPORATE 
OFFENDERS 12, 283–314 (1983) (finding that the negative impact of adverse publicity 
on offenders and their employees may be more effective than the threat of formal 
sanctions in controlling corporate crime); Barnard, supra note 135, at 970–71 (citing 
Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing 
a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 549, 572 (1996)) (stating 
that individuals’ feelings of guilt and shame, and the threat of informal sanctions are 
“significant deterrents” to corporate crime); Lori A. Elis & Sally S. Simpson, Informal 
Sanction Threats and Corporate Crime: Additive Versus Multiplicative Models, 32 J. CRIME & 
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The increased certainty of personal liability combined with the 
stigma associated with criminal prosecutions provides criminal law 
with a unique and effective way of targeting corporate misconduct.  
Civil suits rarely hold private individuals accountable in the corporate 
context.140  The barriers to personal liability, however, do not apply to 
violations of criminal law.141  Criminal prosecutions can also result in 
extra-monetary sanctions and implications, which enhance their 
ability to deter wrongdoing.142  The possibility that a corporate 
executive may be put in jail, or even placed at a personal financial 
risk, will affect his or her decision-making differently than will the 
possibility of a fine that will ultimately be paid by the corporation.  
Executives are unlikely to consider individual criminal liability to be a 
“cost of doing business”; therefore, the imposition of such liability 
could have strong deterrent implications not otherwise achievable 
through civil law.143 
 
DELINQ. 399, 410 (1995) (concluding that subjects’ perceptions that friends, family 
and business associates will lose respect for them if they participate in corporate 
crime significantly decrease the likelihood that they will do so); Harold G. Grasmick 
& Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others, and Rational Choice: Extending the 
Deterrence Model, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 837 (1990) (concluding that like state-imposed 
sanctions, self-imposed shame and socially-imposed embarrassment can also deter 
future criminal activity); Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, Enduring 
Individual Differences and Rational Choice Theories of Crime, 27 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 467, 485 
(1993) (stating that anticipation of shame is negatively related to likelihood of 
committing certain crimes). 
 139  Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 138.  Specific deterrence refers to the ability of 
a sanction to deter the specific individual punished from committing additional 
crimes.  General deterrence refers to the ability of a sanction to deter others who 
have not yet offended from ever committing crime.  See Paternoster, supra note 128, 
at 766.  In this context, specific deterrence would apply to the corporate executive 
subject to criminal prosecution while general deterrence would apply to those in the 
“broader business community.”  Barnard, supra note 135, at 971. 
 140  See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 141  Petrin, supra note 108, at 304. 
 142  Barnard, supra note 135, at 971 (“[E]ffective deterrence (at least of 
individuals) can also come from non-economic sources. Shaming is one such 
source.”). 
 143  Angelides, Renew Urgency on Wall Street Probe, supra note 47 (“Deterring future 
crimes can’t be accomplished simply through fines or negotiated financial 
settlements—which many banks regard as the cost of doing business.  Senior 
executives need to know that if they violate the law, there will be real 
consequences.”). 
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IV. IMPOSING CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON CORPORATE EXECUTIVES AFTER 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A. An Evaluation of the Criminal Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
Although the Dodd-Frank Act adds new crimes to the already 
expansive federal crime repertoire, it does not substantively give the 
DOJ a new way to criminally target the dishonest conduct that was an 
underlying cause of the recent financial crisis.144  In addition, the 
fraud provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act do not address the issues that 
have prevented the DOJ from bringing criminal indictments against 
the executives of financial institutions.145  As a result, it is unlikely that 
prosecutors will be able to use these provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act 
to more successfully impose criminal liability on Wall Street 
executives. 
First, the Section 741 fraud provisions of Title VII appear to 
duplicate what is already criminalized by the mail fraud146 and wire 
fraud147 statutes of the United States Code.148  The mail and wire fraud 
statutes are incredibly broad.149  Wire fraud, which is more applicable 
today as information is usually transmitted electronically rather than 
by mail, imposes criminal liability on anyone who: 
. . . having devised or intending to devise any scheme or 
artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of 
wire, radio, or television communication in interstate or 
foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or 
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or 
artifice, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not 
more than 20 years, or both.  If the violation . . . affects a 
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than 
$1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.150 
Section 741, by contrast, imposes criminal liability for fraud only 
when it relates to entering a futures contract or to making a swap on 
 
 144  See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the causes of the recent financial crisis. 
 145  See supra Part II.B for a discussion of the DOJ’s reasons for not pursuing 
financial fraud charges against financial executives. 
 146  18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 147  Id. at § 1343. 
 148  Juliane Balliro, Criminal Provisions and Implications of the Dodd-Frank Act, FOR 
THE DEFENSE 50, 53 (July 2011), http://www.nelsonmullins.com
/DocumentDepot/Balliro_DRI.pdf. 
 149  Id. 
 150  18 U.S.C. § 1343 (emphasis added). 
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a securities transaction.151  These types of transactions, however, are 
necessarily covered by the language of the wire fraud statute.  Futures 
contracts and securities transactions are made for the purpose of 
“obtaining money or property.”152  In addition, the jurisdictional 
requirement that a representation be “transmitted by means of 
wire . . . in interstate or foreign commerce”153 is not difficult to meet 
today, since electronic communication exists in almost every industry.  
As a result, Section 741 does not criminalize any new behavior apart 
from what can already be prosecuted as wire fraud. 
Section 741, moreover, imposes less harsh criminal penalties 
than the wire fraud statute does.  A defendant who is convicted under 
Section 741 faces a potential prison term of up to ten years.154  Under 
the wire fraud statute, however, the same defendant faces a penalty of 
up to thirty years.155  While an increase in severity of punishment does 
not necessarily lend itself to more effective deterrence,156 this point 
emphasizes that Section 741 does not provide any new mechanism 
for prosecuting financial fraud. 
Furthermore, Section 741 neither alters the criminal intent 
requirement for federal securities fraud cases, nor affects the burden 
of proof that prosecutors must meet to obtain a criminal 
conviction.157  But this requirement of showing that defendants, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, intended to deceive their investors is 
exactly what the DOJ struggled to prove in the Bear Stearns trial.158  
Additionally, the DOJ expressly acknowledged that its inability to 
fulfill this requirement was an instrumental factor in its decision to 
drop its criminal investigation against Goldman Sachs.159  Since 
Section 741 does not address the underlying issues that the DOJ has 
with respect to these criminal prosecutions, it is unlikely that Section 
741 will alter the status quo by providing a more effective way for the 
 
 151  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 741, 124 Stat. 1376, 1731 (2010).  
 152  18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 153  Id. 
 154  7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(5) (2006); see also Balliro, supra note 148. 
 155  18 U.S.C. § 1343. 
 156  See supra Part III.C for a discussion on how the certainty and severity of 
punishment impact deterrence. 
 157  Prosecutors must prove each element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable 
doubt before a conviction can be obtained against a criminal defendant.  This 
standard is a constitutional right guaranteed to all criminal defendants by the Due 
Process Clause.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
 158  See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text. 
 159  See Albergotti & Rappaport, supra note 79; Ingram, supra note 79; Mattingly, 
supra note 79. 
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government to criminally investigate and indict corporate banking 
executives. 
Section 747, by contrast, facially addresses the issue of proving 
mens rea, as it allows for liability to be imposed when one acts with 
reckless disregard that counterparties to his or her swap transaction will 
use the swap to defraud.160  But although Section 747 allows a less 
culpable state of mind on the part of defendants,161 it does not 
address the fact that, for liability to be imposed, the primary 
offenders (i.e., the ones committing the fraud) still must have intent 
to deceive.  This is because, in order to show that defendants were 
criminally reckless, meaning they consciously disregarded a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk,162 with regard to whether the 
counterparties would commit fraud, there must be some evidence 
that the counterparties did, in fact, intend to commit fraud.163  Even 
with the lower mens rea standard for secondary offenders, the DOJ 
will likely struggle in bringing these cases; the evidentiary difficulties 
that hinder investigations against primary offenders will similarly 
persist during investigations against secondary offenders.  As a result, 
it is unlikely that Section 747 will be effective in increasing individual 
criminal accountability. 
B. A Comparison with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
The scarcity and inadequacy of the criminal provisions in the 
Dodd-Frank Act stand in stark contrast to the criminal penalties in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.164  The two statutes are similar in that they 
were both passed in an effort to curb dishonesty and to increase 
accountability in the financial world.165  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
 
 160  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 747, 124 Stat. 1376, 1739 (2010). 
 161  Criminal recklessness is a less culpable state of mind than both criminal intent 
and criminal knowledge.  Compare MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13(14), 2.02(2)(c) (2012) 
(defining recklessly), with MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 1.13(13), 2.02(2)(b) (2012) 
(defining knowingly). 
 162  MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
 163  If there were no evidence that the counterparties (i.e., the primary offenders) 
intended to commit fraud, then under Section 747, defendants (i.e., the secondary 
offenders) could not be shown to have consciously disregarded a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the counterparties would, in fact, commit fraud. 
 164  Compare Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. 1376, with Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 165  Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1376 (“An Act [t]o promote the financial stability 
of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system, to end ‘too big to fail’, to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts, 
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other 
purposes.”); Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. at 745 (“An Act [t]o protect investors by 
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however, contains a myriad of certification provisions that are 
enforceable by criminal penalties.166  For example, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act explicitly provides that a CEO or CFO can go to prison for 
“falsely certifying corporate financial reports and reports on internal 
controls[.]”167  These provisions were a direct response to the 
Enron/WorldCom/Tyco accounting scandals168 in the same way that 
the Dodd-Frank Act was a response to the recent financial crisis.169 
In the years since Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, few, 
if any, individual criminal prosecutions have been brought as a result 
of it.170  Some critics cite this as a failure of the Act to hold financial 
executives accountable.171  What such criticism fails to recognize, 
however, is that even without being utilized as a prosecutorial tool, 
Sarbanes-Oxley has had a resounding effect on the behavior of 
corporate executives.172 
After Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, many 
corporations began to require multiple layers of sub-certification, 
which mandate that numerous lower-level officials “attest to the 
accuracy of financial reports” before such reports reach the CEO or 
CFO.173  The threat of personal and criminal liability for false or 
materially misleading financial reports leads many CEOs to refuse to 
sign a report unless it is certified by a lower-level executive.174  In fact, 
one survey of corporate leaders found that, on average, between 
twenty-two and twenty-three executives submit a sub-certification for a 
report before it is signed by the CEO or CFO.175 
 
improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the 
securities laws, and for other purposes.”). 
 166  Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 116 Stat. 745. 
 167  Alison Frankel, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Lost Promise, REUTERS (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/27/us-financial-sarbox-
idUSBRE86Q1BY20120727. 
 168  Kathleen A. Lacey, Barbara Crutchfield George & Clyde Stoltenberg, Assessing 
the Deterrent Effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s Certification Provisions: A Comparative 
Analysis Using the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 397, 401–03 
(2005). 
 169  See supra Part II.C. 
 170  Frankel, supra note 167; Wang, supra note 10. 
 171  Daniel V. Dooley, Sr. & Mark Radke, Does Severe Punishment Deter Financial 
Crimes?, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 619, 620–21 (2010). 
 172  Frankel, supra note 167. 
 173  Id. 
 174  Id. 
 175  Jo Lynne Koehn & Stephen C. DelVecchio, Revisiting the Ripple Effects of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 76 C.P.A. J. 32 (May 2006), available at http://www.nysscpa.org
/printversions/cpaj/2006/506/p32.htm. 
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The practical effect of this change is that corporations had to 
become more vigilant in their financial reporting procedures at all 
levels.176  In this way, increased personal accountability for false or 
materially misleading financial statements deters fraudulent 
reporting, and as a result, “there have been few accounting scandals 
at major public corporations since Sarbanes-Oxley took effect.”177 
Further, the fact that Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
during a time when the federal government was comparatively much 
more aggressive in prosecuting financial fraud178 likely amplifies its 
effectiveness with regard to deterrence.  The criminal convictions of 
financial CEOs such as Enron’s Kenneth Lay and Jeffrey Skilling send 
a message to the corporate world that the government will not 
tolerate this type of ethical misconduct.  Combined with Sarbanes-
Oxley’s creation of new targeted federal crimes, the perceived 
probability of an individual financial executive being held criminally 
liable for false or misleading financial statements is greatly increased.  
This consequence, in turn, allows for a much greater deterrent effect. 
C. A Proposal to More Effectively Impose Criminal Liability 
In the way that legislators specifically drafted the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act to hold individual financial executives accountable for the 
conduct underlying the accounting scandals of the early 2000s, this 
Comment proposes that the Dodd-Frank Act would be a more 
valuable tool in deterring and prosecuting the conduct underlying 
the recent financial crisis if it contained more substantive criminal 
provisions that directly target financial executives. 
For example, the Dodd-Frank Act could include provisions 
similar to the certification provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
imposing requirements on high-ranking corporate officials that are 
enforceable through criminal penalties.  This could entail requiring 
high-level executives, such as CEOs and/or CFOs, to submit quarterly 
statements certifying that they have reviewed both the internal risk-
management controls of the institution and the investor disclosures 
and have independently determined that both are adequate and non-
misleading. 
Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act could impose disclosure 
requirements on any senior-level executive who decides to override 
 
 176  Frankel, supra note 167. 
 177  Id. 
 178  See supra notes 69–75 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
Enron/Worldcom/Tyco prosecutions. 
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an underwriter’s decision to not purchase and securitize a particular 
bundle of loans because the loans in the bundle do not meet the 
institution’s underwriting standards.  Namely, the executive could be 
mandated to issue a statement outlining the reasons behind the 
decision and why he or she believes that the risks associated with the 
investment should be overlooked.  This requirement would impose a 
greater degree of individual accountability on senior-level executives 
for excessive risk-taking and encourage more ex ante consideration of 
consequences. 
In addition, creating more targeted crimes would allow the DOJ 
to bring more narrowly tailored cases against individuals, which may 
help the DOJ in proving intent beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury.  
The DOJ cited an inability to prove mens rea as the key issue that 
forestalled its prosecution of the Bear Stearns managers for fraud in 
2009.179  The government tried to frame the case as one of 
straightforward lying, but the jury did not believe the situation to be 
so simple.180  The ability to utilize a statute that more directly 
addresses the type of behavior at issue—making misleading, and even 
false, statements to investors regarding the risks of their 
investments—would increase the government’s chances of 
convincing a jury of criminal intent. 
This is because the criminality of the conduct would no longer 
be at issue.  When the DOJ charged the Bear Stearns managers with 
fraud, it had to prove to the jury not only that the managers 
intentionally misled investors, but also that the act of misleading 
investors was an instance of criminal fraud, rather than a “permissible 
spin” of the facts.181  If, however, statutory support had been available 
for the government to assert that misleading investors is a criminal 
act, then the government would only have needed to prove the first 
issue to the jury: that the individuals intended their statements to be 
misleading.  The confusion that exists as to whether or not this type 
of misrepresentation should be criminally punished would dissipate. 
Furthermore, this alternative would be more desirable than 
lowering the mens rea standard for criminal fraud to recklessness or 
gross negligence, as doing so could have potentially catastrophic 
consequences on the financial industry.  Risk-taking is an inherent 
part of participation in financial markets, and criminal laws should 
not be aimed at constraining opportunistic behavior.  Rather, it is 
 
 179  Efrati & Lattman, supra note 55; Kouwe, supra note 55. 
 180  See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
 181  Thomas, supra note 57. 
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only when one crosses the line and employs deceptive techniques to 
gain a tactical advantage within the market or to make excessive 
profits at the expense of others that the criminal law must intervene. 
Finally, this is not to say that the Dodd-Frank Act, as currently 
enacted, holds no potential to facilitate the prosecution of financial 
fraud.  The recent financial crisis was different from those of the past 
in that the allegedly fraudulent behavior took place on a secondary 
derivatives market which, prior to the Dodd-Frank Act, was virtually 
unregulated.182  In past crises, the government brought successful 
criminal actions against individuals in part because regulators had 
the ability to refer such claims to prosecutors.183  The lack of 
regulation, therefore, not only made the perpetration of fraud more 
feasible in the years leading up to the crisis, but also made fraud 
more difficult to pursue in the aftermath.184  By increasing regulation 
in the world of derivative transactions and other swaps of complex 
securities, the Dodd-Frank Act will better equip the government to 
build criminal cases in the future, should the need arise. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In the years since the 2008 financial crisis, public criticism over 
the lack of criminal prosecutions against individual financial 
executives persists.  There remains a lingering sense of injustice over 
the fact that those individuals largely responsible for the economic 
collapse have not been held accountable for their actions.  Though 
this retributivist function of criminal punishment is not insignificant, 
this Comment argues that it is the utilitarian function of criminal 
liability—the goal of attaining deterrent effects—which must be 
emphasized going forward. 
The imposition of criminal liability can deter financial 
executives and, correspondingly, financial institutions from 
defrauding their investors in a way that civil enforcement actions 
cannot.  But to achieve this deterrence, wrongdoers must perceive 
criminal prosecution for such financial fraud to be likely.  As long as 
the DOJ continues to have difficulty in bringing criminal charges in 
this area, the full potential of criminal law to deter corporate 
executive misconduct will not be realized. 
As currently enacted, the criminal provisions of the Dodd-Frank 
 
 182  See Morgenson & Story, supra note 2. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. 
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Act will not effectively enable the DOJ in criminally prosecuting 
financial executives for their roles in bringing about the recent 
financial crisis because the provisions do not address the issues that 
have hindered these prosecutions in the past.  This Comment 
therefore proposes alternative criminal provisions that would be 
better suited to address these impediments.  By adopting these 
measures, the government could more successfully hold the 
individuals responsible for the financial crisis accountable and deter 
others from engaging in similarly self-serving misconduct.  Moreover, 
even if not heavily utilized, the presence of strong, targeted criminal 
penalties in the Act could still serve a valuable deterrent function and 
prevent a similar crisis from arising again. 
